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The Morality of Military Occupation
JEFF MCMAHAN*
I. A NEGLECTED ISSUE
The U.S. military has now occupied Iraq for more than five
years. This is a long time for one state to impose a military
occupation on another. But of course the American occupation of
Iraq seems almost momentary by comparison with Israel's fortyone-year occupation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank
and Gaza. Considering how controversial both these occupations
have been, one would expect them to have elicited a substantial
body of thought about the moral dimensions of the practice of
occupation. But such an expectation would be disappointed. There
is, of course, a body of law governing the practice of occupation,
but the moral foundations of that law have suffered the same
neglect by moral and political theorists that the practice of
occupation itself has. As I prepared my remarks for the conference
from which this symposium issue is derived, I was surprised to be
unable to recall having read or even seen any philosophical
discussions of occupation. I own most of the books that have been
written on the theory of the just war over the past half century or
so, but a search through their indexes turned up only a few entries
on occupation, none of which proved, on investigation, to offer
significant illumination.
I have not, however, had to conjure up a theory de novo.
Occupation involves both the threat of military force and, usually,
the use of military force; hence it is akin to, and indeed often
overlaps with, war (as the alternating references to the occupation
of Iraq and the war in Iraq attest). There should therefore be
continuities between the morality of war and the morality of
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occupation, which will enable us to begin to think about the
morality of occupation by reference to the morality of war.
The morality of war has traditionally been divided between
the principles that justify war itself -that is, that govern the resort
to and continuation of war (jus ad bellum) -and those that govern
the conduct of war (jus in bello). The morality of occupation
naturally contains a parallel division. There are principles that
determine in which conditions occupation is justified, and further
principles that govern the conduct of an occupation.1 And there is
a parallel distinction in the law. According to the law, the rules
governing the conduct of an occupation are the same for legal and
illegal occupations alike, and it is equally possible for forces
conducting an illegal occupation to obey these rules without
detriment to their prospects of success as it is for those conducting
a legal occupation. I will argue, however, that there is a substantial
divergence between the law of occupation and the morality of
occupation, just as I have argued elsewhere that there is a
substantial divergence between the law of war and the morality of
war.2 I will argue that an occupation that is both unjust and
unjustified cannot be conducted in a just or permissible manner.
The morality of the conduct of an occupation cannot be
independent of the morality of the occupation itself.
In this short essay, I will distinguish three morally different
types of occupation. I will then discuss what it is permissible and
impermissible for both occupiers and occupied people to do during
occupations of these three types. Finally, I will conclude with a few
observations about the relation between the morality of
occupation and the law of occupation.
II. JUST OCCUPATION

The occupation of a territory by a foreign power is imposed
and maintained by military force. It requires the use of military
force against those who resist or oppose it, and almost inevitably
1. There are no corresponding Latin terms to refer to the principles governing the
imposition of an occupation and those governing the conduct of an occupation. This is
because neither the Romans nor the classical just war theorists, who wrote in Latin, had a
concept of occupation. The practice of occupation is of recent origin and arose as an
alternative to the traditional practice of conquering and annexing the territory of defeated
enemies.
2. Jeff McMahan, The Morality of War and the Law of War, in JUST AND.UNJUST
WARRIORS: THE LEGAL AND MORAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS

Henry Shue eds., 2008).

19-43 (David Rodin &
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results in instances of brutality toward innocent people when, as is
usually the case, the territory occupied is that of a defeated but still
hated adversary. Even when the occupied people are treated well,
an occupation is usually highly burdensome to them nonetheless,
as it greatly diminishes their capacity for self-determination, both.
individual and collective. Occupation therefore always requires
moral justification. It is, as I indicated, reasonable to assume that
the conditions of a just occupation parallel those of a just war.
As in the case of a just war, the most important condition of a
just occupation is that there should be a just cause-not, of course,
a just cause for war, but a just cause for occupation. As I
understand it, this is not merely a requirement that there be some
significant good to be achieved by the occupation. It is, rather, the
requirement that there be a wrong, or set of wrongs, that the
occupation would prevent or correct, and for which the occupied
people are sufficiently responsible to make them morally liable to
suffer the effects of occupation. To say that the people occupied
are liable to occupation is to say that because of their
responsibility for the problem that the occupation addresses, they
are not wronged by being subject to occupation, or have no valid
complaint about being occupied.
Occupation is largely indiscriminate in its effects, since it is
imposed equally on virtually all of those within the territory under
occupation, most of whom are civilians. But if it is right that a just
occupation must have a just cause, if the existence of a just cause
entails that those who are its intended subjects are liable to it, and
if most of those deliberately subjected to occupation are civilians,
then the possibility of a just occupation presupposes the possibility
of civilian liability. This may seem surprising and implausible to
many proponents of just war theory. According to the reigning
theory of the just war, civilians are innocent, in the technical sense
of not being liable. But when just war theory claims that civilians
are not liable, that is shorthand for the claim that they are not
liable to intentionalattack, and it is compatible with their not being
liable to intentional attack that they can be liable to certain lesser
harms. For proportionality in defensive action is sensitive to the
degree to which an individual is morally responsible for an unjust
threat, which depends in part on the degree to which that
individual has causally contributed to the existence of that threat.
Civilians seldom make significant individual causal contributions
to an unjust war; hence while they may bear sufficient causal and
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moral responsibility to be liable to suffer the effects of economic
sanctions, or perhaps even to suffer certain side effects of military
action, they are rarely sufficiently responsible to be liable to
intentional military attack. They may, nevertheless, be sufficiently
responsible for harms caused during an unjust war to be liable to
pay reparations in its aftermath. Or they may be sufficiently
responsible for the war and thus for unstable conditions resulting
from it to be liable to occupation until those post bellum conditions
can be remedied.
Yet when I claimed that occupation is indiscriminate in its
effects, I was implicitly conceding that it is never the case that all
those who are burdened by a just occupation are liable to suffer its
effects. In every just occupation, there are inevitably some who are
unjustly harmed. If, therefore, one were to justify a just occupation
to all of those affected by it, one would have to invoke different
forms of justification in addressing different people. The three
basic forms of justification are, first, that some people are liable to
it, second, that some people benefit from it and can be presumed
to consent to it, and, third, that some people's suffering from it is
the lesser evil.
Consider, for example, the occupation of a country whose
unjust war of aggression has just been defeated. If the unjust war
was a natural and predictable consequence of the culture that the
citizens themselves had contributed to creating and sustaining, and
if the war enjoyed significant popular support, as was true of the
unjust wars fought by Germany and Japan in the middle of the
twentieth century, then the principal justification for a post bellum
occupation is that most of the people occupied have made
themselves liable to occupation until the relevant features of their
culture and political institutions can be sufficiently altered to
ensure that their society will not again erupt into aggressive war.
Even in such a case, however, there are inevitably many
people who are burdened by the occupation but are not
individually liable to bear those burdens. If the harms inflicted on
these people are justifiable, the justification must take the same
form as the traditional justification for the killing and injuring of
innocent people as a side effect of military action in war. In
contemporary war, it is virtually impossible to conduct large-scale
military action without foreseeably, though unintentionally, killing
or injuring innocent people. The traditional view in just war theory
is that these effects can be justified if they are both unintended and
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proportionate in relation to the importance of the military action.
Similarly, when innocent people are harmed, or wronged, by an
occupation, the occupation may still be just if most of those under
occupation are liable to suffer its effects and the harm to those
who are not is unintended and proportionate.
It may seem, however, that burdens imposed universally, or
on everyone, during an occupation must be intentionally imposed
even on those who are innocent. But this is debatable; indeed, I
think it is false. Return to the analogy with killing in war. Suppose
a pilot can bomb a concentration of approximately one hundred
people, virtually all of whom he knows are enemy combatants. But
suppose he can identify one or two innocent civilians among them.
According to the traditional view, he can drop his bomb intending
to kill only the combatants yet foreseeing that he will also kill the
civilians. Although he drops his bomb on the civilians, he does not
intend to kill them. Killing them is neither his end nor his means; it
does not serve any purpose for him and is no part of his plan.
This example is, however, not quite analogous to an
occupation to which most of the people occupied are liable. For in
such an occupation, those who are not liable to be burdened in
general cannot be identified. A closer analogy is therefore a case
in which the pilot can bomb a concentration of approximately one
hundred people, all of whom appear to be enemy combatants
though the pilot knows that one or two are innocent civilians who
have been forced to wear the uniform of enemy combatants. Again
according to the traditional view, the pilot can bomb the entire
concentration intending only to kill combatants though foreseeing
that his act will kill one or two innocent civilians, whom he would
spare if he could identify them and avoid harming them. In one
sense, of course, he intends to kill everyone, one or two of whom
are innocent civilians; but that is compatible with his intending to
kill combatants only.
To see this, compare a sequence _of individual executions. A
judge may sequentially order the execution of one hundred
people, believing that each is guilty and thus intending to execute
only guilty people, even if he knows that it is statistically certain
that one of the people he executes is innocent. He never intends to
kill an innocent person though he knows that one of the people he
intentionally kills is innocent, though of course he does not know
which. The same description applies to the pilot. And, more
importantly for our purposes, a parallel description might apply to
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those who organize and direct an occupation. In part because they
cannot determine who among the occupied people are innocent,
they impose the occupation on the entire population. But that is
compatible with their intending to restrict the action only of those
who have made themselves liable to occupation, while merely
foreseeing that the occupation will burden many innocent people
as well. There is, after all, no point in their restricting the action of
those who pose no threat and would cooperate with them
voluntarily. Restricting these people's freedom is neither an end
nor a means but a mere side effect. Because these people cannot
be reliably identified, they must share the burden with those who
are liable.
For the occupation to be just despite the unjust harm it causes
to these innocent people, the harm they suffer must be unintended
and proportionate in relation to the just goal the occupation is
intended to achieve. The harm they suffer is justified by virtue of
being the unintended lesser evil.
Suppose the innocent people could be identified, but that
exempting them from the burdens of occupation (for example,
from curfews) would require excessive administrative costs and
would involve a significant risk that the exemptions would be
exploited by those engaged in violent resistance against the
occupation. If the innocent people could be spared the burdens but
are not, it seems that exposing them to those burdens must count
as intended-or, to be more precise, not exempting them from the
burdens of the occupation is intended as a means of avoiding risks
and costs. If intention is relevant to justification, an occupation in
which the innocent could be spared but are not will be harder to
justify morally than one in which the innocent cannot be identified
and spared, even if in the former case the costs of identification
would be prohibitive.
Thus far I have been discussing a. just occupation following
the defeat of a popularly supported war of aggression. There are,
however, unjust wars of aggression that are not the product of a
society and its culture, but are initiated within an undemocratic
country by a dictatorial elite whose commands it would be
virtually suicidal to defy or oppose. The war fought by Iraq against
Iran in the 1980s was such a war. The civilian citizens would bear
little or.no responsibility for a war of this sort and thus would not
be liable to occupation following its defeat. In the absence of
significant civilian responsibility for the war, of course, there
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would be less reason for an occupation, and even if one were
necessary it would be less likely to be resisted if it were clearly
intended to facilitate the transition to a different and more benign
form of governance. Yet if for some reason there was a compelling
case for a post bellum occupation to which the people were not
liable and to which they were in general opposed, the justification
would have to be that the consequences of not occupying the
country would be so much worse, impartially considered, than
those of an occupation, that the rights of the occupied people are
overridden. Lesser-evil justifications of this sort are rarely valid in
practice.
Another circumstance in which an occupation might be just is
the immediate aftermath of a justified humanitarian intervention,
when it may be necessary to offer continued protection to a
persecuted group by forcibly restraining the government and those
among its supporters who have been guilty of the violent
persecution of the members of that group. The justification for an
occupation in these conditions would include elements of all three
forms of justification noted earlier. The -government and its
supporters would be liable to the burdens of occupation, the
beneficiaries of the intervention would continue to benefit from
the occupation and so could be presumed to consent to it, and the
burdens* imposed on the remaining people who are neither the
intended targets nor the intended beneficiaries of the occupation
would have to be justified as unintended, but proportionate evils.
III. UNJUST OCCUPATION

The various reasons why an occupation may be wrong parallel
the reasons why a war may be wrong. For example, even if there is
a just cause for war, war may be wrong because the just cause can
be achieved by less destructive means, or because the pursuit of
the just cause by means of war would cause disproportionate harm.
Similarly, there might be a just cause for occupation when
or
unnecessary
be
nevertheless
would
occupation
wrong
but
be
would
disproportionate. In such a case, occupation
perhaps not unjust, since the people on whom it would be imposed
would be liable. They would have a valid complaint but it would
not be that they were being unjustly harmed but that they were
being unnecessarily harmed, or harmed -to a degree
disproportionate to their liability.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 31:7

But perhaps the most common reason why a war is wrong is
that it lacks a just cause-which is to say, on the understanding of
the notion of just cause I have suggested, that the people warred
against have done nothing to make themselves liable to military
attack. The parallel category of occupation consists of those
occupations that are unjust because the people occupied have not
made themselves liable to suffer the burdens of occupation. No
doubt in the aftermath of every war there are some people on the
side .that fought without just cause who are liable to b.e forcibly
restrained in certain ways for a certain period. But there is a just
cause for occupation only if these people are sufficiently
numerous, or constitute a sufficient proportion of the civilian
population, to make an occupation necessary rather than a set of
more finely targeted restrictions that could be imposed only on
those who are liable to suffer restraint.
Most occupations that are unjust in this sense-that is, that
wrong the majority of people burdened by them because those
people are not liable to suffer those burdens-are also morally
unjustified. But just as there can be an occupation for which there
is a just cause but that is unjustified because it is unnecessary or
disproportionate, so there can be an occupation that is unjust
because it lacks a just cause but that is nonetheless overall morally
justified. Such an occupation might be justified, even though it
wrongs those subject to it, if the consequences of not conducting it
would be much worse, impartially considered. This is a familiar, if
perhaps uncommon, form of justification. Most of.us concede that
it can be permissible to infringe a person's rights, even
intentionally, if that is necessary to avert a significantly greater
harm. The person's rights are, we say, "overridden," though the
infringement leaves a residual obligation to compensate the person
later, if possible. In most cases of this sort, a person's rights are
infringed in the course of averting a much greater harm to others.
But it seems that there can .also be cases in which one is justified in
infringing a person's rights for his own sake.
Suppose, for example, that a surgeon culpably injures a man
in a way that is potentially lethal. The man is unconscious and will
soon die unless his leg is amputated. Given the conditions he has
wrongfully created, the surgeon is now morally justified in
amputating the man's leg, thereby infringing his right, though for
his own sake. (If the man were conscious, he would no doubt
waive his right by consenting to the amputation. That might
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remove one objection to the amputation, preventing it from being
an infringement of a right and thereby shifting the moral focus
more to the initial act of injuring. But the surgeon would remain
responsible, and culpable, for the man's loss of his leg, even
though the amputation was, in the circumstances, the lesser evil.)
Occupations that are unjust because they lack a just cause but
are nevertheless morally justified as the lesser evil may also be
divided into those that are justified because they avert greater
harms to others and those that are justified because they are, in the
circumstances, the lesser evil for those subject to them. Those of
the first sort are arguably less common than those of the second. It
is hard to think of realistic circumstances in which the rights of
innocent people against occupation could be overridden by the
necessity of occupying them in order to avert a much greater harm
to others. It is, however, easy to imagine circumstances in which an
occupation is unjust, in that the people generally have done
nothing to make themselves liable to it, but is nevertheless morally
justified as the lesser evil for those same people. The occupation of
Iraq is arguably an example of an occupation of this sort. This is
not the place to argue in detail that the war in Iraq was an unjust
war, but a brief indication' of how the argument would go may be
relevant.
Those who sought to justify the war in moral terms made two
claims: that it was justified as an instance of preventive defense
and that it was justified as an instance of humanitarian
intervention. The case for preventive defense hinged crucially on
the claim that Iraq possessed certain types of weapons of mass
destruction and was poised to acquire other types as well. But in
fact Iraq neither had such weapons nor was on the verge of
acquiring them, and key figures in the Bush administration knew
at the time that the evidence for a threat from Iraq was negligible.
They made no effort to verify what little supposed evidence they
had and their precipitate invasion preempted the thorough
investigation and accounting of Iraq's arsenal that had finally
become possible and would have refuted the claims about the
necessity of preventive defense.
The claim that the war was justified because it liberated the
Iraqi people from an oppressive dictatorship is stronger but fails
on two counts. First, the war has violated any reasonable
proportionality constraint. Estimates vary considerably, but it is
uncontroversial that over one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians
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have been killed since the initial invasion in 2003.' More than two
million others have fled the country and are living as refugees in
neighboring countries, mainly Jordan and Syria, and nearly three
million have been displaced internally by violence and persecution.
Given that there were fewer than thirty million people in Iraq
prior to the war, this means that at least one person in every three
hundred has been killed while another seventeen percent of the
population have fled their homes to avoid inclusion in the
mortality figures. It was entirely foreseeable that there would be
resistance to an American invasion and that the sudden dissolution
of structures of political authority would release the smoldering
animosities among different ethnic and religious groups that had
hitherto been forcibly contained by the Baathist dictatorship. Thus
far, therefore, the war has indisputably been far worse for most
Iraqis than if they had just been left alone. Defenders of the war
may argue that the overthrow of the dictatorship will nevertheless
work to the benefit of the Iraqi people in the long term. But in a
case such as this, short-term failure is failure. For no dictatorship
can endure indefinitely and this one would eventually, perhaps
even by now, have been brought down by other and, probably, less
destructive means.
Defenders might also argue that the Iraqi people are in fact
liable to occupation because it is precisely their own ethnic and
religious divisions that make the occupation necessary. Yet while
this objection is correct in principle, it is mistaken about the facts.
It is false that the majority of Iraqis would immediately be at each
other's throats in the absence of coercive authority. What seems to
be true is that small minorities in the different groups would begin
to attack members of other groups, leading to an escalating cycle
of violence, much of which would involve justified defense. Thus,
prior to the initiation of such a cycle of violence, only those
minorities are liable to preventive restrictions of their liberty.
The second reason the war cannot be justified as an instance
of humanitarian intervention is that it is a condition of justification
for that kind of war that the alleged beneficiaries should welcome
it; yet despite the desire of most Iraqis not to be ruled by Saddam
Hussein, there was no evidence-nor was any sought-that a

3. For the various estimates, see National Public Radio, The Toll of War in Iraq:
U.S. Casualties and Civilian Deaths, http://www.npr.org/news/specials/tollofwar/
tollofwarmain.html (last visited March 8, 2009).
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majority wanted to get rid of him by means of a U.S. invasion and
occupation. Because humanitarian intervention imposes on its
intended beneficiaries all the risks involved in having a war fought
where they live, as well as the risks of subsequent domination and
exploitation by the intervening power, they must have the right to
determine whether they wish to accept those risks in exchange for
the potential benefits.
Sometimes, of course, it is abundantly clear that the victims of
domestic persecution desperately want external protection. as in
Rwanda in 1994, when an entire population was being slaughtered.
In these cases there is little need to look for signs of consent. But
in Iraq, though there was no political freedom and the state used
terrorist means to suppress domestic dissent, the vast majority of
people were able to live their lives in relative security. So it is no
surprise that many of them preferred to continue to live under
domestic despotism than to risk dying in a war fought by an
untrusted and, as it turns out, untrustworthy foreign power-one
that had helped to maintain Saddam Hussein in power as long as it
was in its interest to do so, that had bombed their capital just over
a decade earlier, and that had a manifest interest in ensuring the
availability of their oil reserves.
The requirement that a war of humanitarian intervention be
welcomed by the great majority of its ostensible beneficiaries,
which we may loosely refer to as the "consent condition," does
not, in my view, derive from a principle of respect for collective
autonomy. If it is certain that many more of a country's innocent
citizens would be killed in the absence of intervention, but a
majority of them refuse to believe it, intervention may be justified
despite their misguided opposition. One must not allow the human
rights of the minority to be sacrificed because of the mistaken
beliefs of the majority. The basis of the consent condition is
instead largely pragmatic. Because the risks imposed by war are
uncertain, and because an oppressed people know better than
others what they can endure, decision-making authority with
respect to humanitarian intervention should be allocated in such a
way as to give them a moral veto. They may not be entitled to
demand an intervention, but the presumption must be that an
intervention may not be undertaken unless there is compelling
reason to think that the majority of its intended beneficiaries
would welcome it.
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When an instance of humanitarian intervention fails to satisfy
the consent condition, does it follow that the war lacks. a just
cause? There are two ways of answering this question and I am
uncertain which is better. I have claimed that there is a just cause
for war when those warred against have made themselves liable to
military attack as a means of preventing or correcting a wrong for
which they are responsible. I agree with supporters of the war that
Saddam Hussein and those complicit in maintaining his rule were
guilty of egregious and continuing wrongs against the vast majority
of people in Iraq. He and those who shielded him were therefore
morally liable to forcible removal from power to prevent the
continued infliction of those wrongs. One could claim, then, that
there was a just cause for war but that the war was nevertheless
unjustified because it violated an entirely distinct and independent
requirement: the consent condition.
Alternatively, one could incorporate the consent condition in
the requirement of just cause, claiming that if the intended
beneficiaries of an act of defense themselves object to being
defended, that makes the act of defense unjust. Suppose that a
third party proposes to defend an innocent victim from a culpable
attacker but that the potential victim wants not to be defended and
forbids the intervention. It seems that although third party defense
would not wrong the attacker, it would wrong the victim. One
could argue that the opposition of the beneficiary, especially if it is
well-grounded (for example, the culpable attacker is her own
child), effectively nullifies the reason for the intervention (that is,
the apparent just cause for third party defense). If that can be true
in the individual case, it may be true as well in cases in which the
numbers of attackers, innocent victims, and potential third party
interveners are all vastly greater, as in humanitarian intervention.
This answer requires a revision of the rather simple account I have
given of the requirement of just cause in ways that would make it
complex, but this would be an easy revision to make.'
moreReturning
from this short theoretical digression to the
evaluation of the war in Iraq, I suggest that because both of the
moral justifications that were offered fail, and because there are no
other candidate justifications with even minimal plausibility, it is

4. For further discussion of these issues, see Jeff McMahan, Humanitarian
Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality,in ETHICS AND HUMANITY: THEMES FROM
THE PHILOSOPHY OF JONATHAN GLOVER (forthcoming 2009).
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reasonable to proceed on the assumption that the war was unjust,
in that there was no positive reason to initiate it that justified the
predictable wronging of those whom it was allegedly intended to
benefit. Yet the war itself dismantled the structures of political
authority in Iraq, leaving a vacuum that had to be filled if the
country were not to descend into anarchy, chaos, and, potentially,
civil war. In these conditions, wrongfully created by the unjust
invasion, a brief occupation was justified as necessary for the
security of those made vulnerable by the dissolution of the
government. At that point, it was unavoidable that the United
States' prior action would inflict great evil on the people of Iraq.
Of the possible evils, occupation was arguably the least bad for the
potential victims. Although unjust, an occupation (though not the
actual occupation, which was conducted for years with appalling
cynicism and incompetence) was morally justified.
IV. PERMISSIBLE ACTION DURING A JUST OCCUPATION

I have claimed that there are two sorts of unjust occupation,
or occupation that wrongs the occupied people. There are
occupations that are both unjust and unjustified, and occupations
that are unjust but nevertheless morally justified, all things
considered. I will sometimes refer to occupiers of both sorts as
"unjust occupiers," though I will also use the term "unjustified
occupiers" to refer specifically to those whose occupation is both
unjust and unjustified, and "justified occupiers" to refer to those
whose occupation, though unjust, is nevertheless justified all things
considered. I will reserve the term "just occupiers" for those who
conduct an occupation that is both just and justified. (One might
distinguish a fourth category of occupations that are just because
they have a just cause but unjustified because they are either
unnecessary or disproportionate. I will not discuss occupations of
this sort.)
Thus far I have been discussing the conditions in which an
occupation might be justified. This is the part of the ethics of
occupation that corresponds to the principles of jus ad bellum. I
will now turn to question of what it is permissible for people to do
during the course of an occupation-that is, the part of the ethics
of occupation that corresponds to the principles of jus in bello. I
will begin by discussing permissible conduct during a just
occupation.
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In a just occupation following a just war, what the occupiers
owe to the occupied people may be different depending on what
the just cause for the war was. For example, what the occupiers
owe may be different in the aftermath of a war fought to defeat
unjust aggression from what they owe after a war of humanitarian
intervention.
Consider the Allied occupation of Germany after WWII. As I
noted earlier, the various *unjust Nazi invasions were natural
outgrowths of the culture and ideology of Nazism, which the mass
of Germans had embraced with enthusiasm. Hitler had been
democratically elected and the Nazis' numerous campaigns of
aggression enjoyed widespread popular support. The great
majority of adult German civilians were therefore complicit to a
greater or lesser degree in Germany's unjust war (or wars), which
had made an occupation necessary. The necessity of occupation
derived at least in part from the just aim of ensuring that Germany
would not again erupt into aggressive war. This required a process
of disarmament, the removal of key Nazi figures from positions of
power, and the gradual restructuring or replacement of Nazi
political, legal, and other institutions. Many of the required acts
were illegal under the law of occupation, but were nevertheless
morally justified.' The moral justification for imposing an
occupation as a means of achieving those just aims was that the
great majority of adult Germans had, by being active or passive
accessories to Nazi aggression, made themselves morally liable to
suffer the burdens of occupation, given that occupation was
necessary to prevent their society from committing further wrongs
of the sort it had already committed on a massive scale.
In such conditions, in which the great majority of those
burdened by an occupation have made themselves liable to suffer
those burdens, the duties of the occupiers to the people occupied
are mainly negative rather than positive in character. The occupied
people are, in other words, primarily owed duties of forbearance
and restraint:
duties that they not be made the objects of
vengeance, cruelty, or any other forms of gratuitously inflicted or
tolerated suffering (duties that the Allies did not consistently fulfill
during the occupation of Germany).6 It is not that there are no
5. See, e.g., EVAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 91-106

(1993).
6. See GILES MACDONOGH, AFTER THE REICH: THE BRUTAL HISTORY OF THE

ALLIED OCCUPATION 237-242 (Basic Books 2007).
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positive duties to protect and promote the well-being of the people
under occupation, but only that such duties are fewer and weaker
the more responsible the people are for the conditions that
necessitate the occupation. The occupation of postwar Germany,
which dovetailed with the Marshall Plan to facilitate West
Germany's spectacular political and economic recovery, shows in
any case that magnanimity and generosity are often also a matter
of enlightened self-interest.
Even after the defeat of a war of aggression, the liability to
occupation of the citizens of the aggressor state may be weak if
they had little or no power to restrain the action of their
government. In this case the positive duties of the occupying
power are stronger than they would be if the liability of the people
.were greater.
If an occupation is required in the aftermath of a just instance
of humanitarian intervention, some of the occupied people -those
complicit in the wrongs the intervention brought to an end-may
be liable to be occupied, while others-the victims of those
wrongs-are not. The justification for the occupation must thus
appeal to the claim that the former are liable to suffer it while the
latter are either benefited by it or are unintentionally burdened by
it as the lesser evil. The difference between the justifications for
what is done to the members of the different groups then
corresponds to a difference in the duties that are owed by the
occupiers to the different groups. As was true of most adult
Germans after WWII, those who are liable to be occupied are
owed mainly negative duties, while those who are not liable may
be owed extensive positive duties of aid, protection, and so on.
They are victims and their benefactors may owe them more than
just stopping their persecution -though once the occupation has
ended, these beneficiaries may owe their benefactors not only
gratitude, but even compensation, if that is possible; however, their
duty to compensate the interveners will be slight in comparison to
that of the people whose wrongful persecution of them
necessitated the intervention.
The morality of conduct during an occupation is, of course,
not just a matter of what occupiers owe to the occupied; there is
also the question of what the occupied people owe to the
occupiers. The most important question here is whether there is a
right of violent resistance. When an occupation is both just, in that
most of those subject to it are liable to suffer it, and also justified,
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it seems obvious that resistance is in general impermissible. I say
"in general" because I can think of at least two possible
exceptions. The most obvious exception is when a just occupation
is being conducted in an unjust or impermissible manner. If just
occupiers are in breach of their negative duties to the occupied
people, resistance may be justified, though only to stop the abuse,
not to defeat the just aims of the occupation.
The other possible exception is more doubtful but is worth
mentioning. This is that those who are not liable to occupation, do
not benefit from it, and indeed are unjustly and severely burdened
by it may be justified in engaging in certain forms of resistance as a
matter of self-defense. The reason this is doubtfully an exception is
that the burdens of occupation are generally temporary and
endurable, so that when an occupation is just and can reasonably
be expected to work to the long-term benefit of the occupied
society as a whole, it may be incumbent on those who are unjustly
burdened to suffer those burdens both for the good of their own
society and, perhaps more importantly, to avoid harming members
of the occupying forces, who are acting with moral justification and
thus are not liable to defensive action.
V. PERMISSIBLE ACTION DURING AN UNJUST, UNJUSTIFIED
OCCUPATION

In an occupation that is both unjust and unjustified, what the
occupiers owe the occupied people is to leave, immediately. After
they have done that, they will owe compensation. It is as simple as
that. But of course they will do neither voluntarily. So it is
important to consider what it may be permissible for the unjustly
occupied civilian population to do in such a situation.
The occupying forces are governing the lives of innocent
people at gunpoint, thereby violating not only these people's rights
to individual liberty and collective self-determination but also their
right not to be threatened with death for acting in ways that are
morally permissible. Even if these forces are acting under duress,
and even if they believe that the occupation is justified, they are
nevertheless responsible for wronging innocent people in ways
that are sufficiently serious to make them liable to violent
resistance if that is necessary for the people to recover their
political freedom. They can have no justified complaint if they are
attacked by those whose rights they are violating. Nazi soldiers in

2009]

The Morality of Military Occupation

occupied France were not wronged when they were attacked by
members of the French Resistance.
Yet the example of the Resistance shows that there is often
an important'moral reason for people under unjust and unjustified
occupation not to attack the occupying forces. This is that
attacking the occupying forces is very likely to provoke reprisals
against the civilian population, for it gives these forces a reason to
attack civilians-namely, to deter further attacks against
themselves. Thus, when the Nazis occupied France, they operated
a savage system of reprisals to deter action by the Resistance. The
walls of the Metro carried notices threatening dire harms against
the relatives of anyone found to be a member of the Resistance.
And whenever a member of the Wehrmacht was killed, a number
of hostages-usually Jews or communists-were executed in
reprisal. When occupying forces are this barbaric, members of the
occupied population may owe it to their innocent fellow citizens
not to expose them to vicious reprisals by attacking the occupying
forces. Yet if violent resistance could reasonably be expected to be
better for the occupied people as a whole than either acquiescence
or nonviolent resistance, it may be morally justified, even when
conducted by civilians against members of the military, and thus in
violation of the laws governing the practice of occupation.
VI. PERMISSIBLE ACTION DURING AN UNJUST BUT JUSTIFIED
OCCUPATION

While the United States has sought to portray the occupation
of Iraq as a just occupation following a just war of humanitarian
intervention, these claims are belied by the fact that it has met with
widespread and determined resistance by diverse uncoordinated
and even rival groups within the civilian population and has been
unable to recruit significant assistance from the Iraqi people in
combating the various insurgencies. This is evident in the absence
of any real distinction between the occupation of Iraq and the war
in Iraq. Rather than being a short-term transitional state between
war and the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty, the occupation
instead devolved into a protracted war of counterinsurgency. Still,
I have argued that some kind of occupation became morally
justified once the United States had overthrown the government of
Iraq and dismantled a range of political institutions necessary for
governance and the maintenance of domestic security. Yet because
the majority of Iraqis neither welcomed the U.S. invasion nor had
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made themselves liable to occupation, any occupation of Iraq
would have been unjust, in that it would have unjustly burdened
the majority of those subject to it, however justified it may have
been on the ground that it was, in the circumstances, the lesser evil
for those burdened by it.
It is in this kind of occupation that the obligations of the
occupier to the occupied people are greatest. When the occupier
has, through its own wrongful action, made it the case that a highly
burdensome occupation is the lesser evil for the occupied people,
it has an obligation as a matter of justice to pay every cost, and
make every sacrifice, necessary to ensure that the victims of its
action are at least as well off as they would have been in the
absence of the action that made the occupation necessary.
The obvious problem, of course, is that those who have
wrongfully created conditions in which a military occupation of an
entire country has become the lesser evil are evidently unfit for the
task of conducting that occupation. Unless there is a radical
change of regime in the responsible country (an event that will
occur six years too late for the people of Iraq), the government of
that country will continue to be guided by the interests and
concerns that motivated the action that created the need for
occupation. That government will not fulfill its obligations to the
victims of its action but will exploit the occupation as a further
means of achieving its own aims. Even if this were not the case and
the government was actually willing to do all it could to rectify its
earlier wrongdoing, it would be in no position to expect the trust
or cooperation of the people it had wronged and would thus be
gravely handicapped in its ability to fulfill its obligations. Perhaps
the ideal solution in these conditions would be for the country that
is responsible for the need for an occupation to pay all of the costs
of an occupation that would be conducted by the forces of a
neutral, impartial power, such as the UN-assuming that such a
power could be found that would be willing to repair the damage.
But that this could actually happen is no more likely than that the
country would fulfill its obligations on its own.
When an occupation is unjust but nevertheless justified as the
lesser evil, are the occupied people justified in engaging in violent
resistance? If an occupation is really objectively justified on the
ground that it is better for the occupied people than any other
feasible alternative, armed resistance must be contrary to the
legitimate interests of the occupied people and thus cannot be
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justified. The occupied people ought instead to cooperate with the
occupiers in order to bring the occupation to as early an end as
possible. One cannot, however, expect all those subject to an
unjust but justified occupation to recognize that it is justified.
Many patriotic members of the occupied population may be
unable to see beyond the simple fact that their country is under
military occupation by a foreign power. Some of these people will
seek to expel the occupiers by force. Their action may be
misguided, but it is understandable in the circumstances. Those
who wrongfully created the need for an occupation would seem to
have greater moral responsibility for the misguided action of these
patriots than the patriots themselves do. It was, after all, the
wrongful action of the occupiers that put these people in a
situation in which it may be reasonable for them to believe that the
occupation is not only unjust but also unjustified. In these
circumstances, the insurgents may have a strong excuse (or even a
subjective justification) for their objectively wrongful resistance,
and this in turn may mean that the justified occupiers ought to
exercise various forms of restraint in fighting against them. 7
Many questions remain. Suppose that an occupation is being
badly conducted and thus is worse for the occupied people than it
need be but is still objectively better for them than no occupation
at all. In these conditions, violent resistance might be justified if it
would prompt the occupiers to alter their strategy in ways that
would improve the character of the occupation and bring it to a
speedier conclusion. But of course it could also provoke harsh
reprisals and in general make the situation worse. Neither ordinary
citizens nor insurgents are likely to be able to determine with any
a badly managed occupation is better than no
confidence
occupation whether
or whether armed resistance would have a beneficial
effect or simply exacerbate the problems. Although in these
conditions, with so much inevitable uncertainty, it may be true to
say that occupying forces could be liable to attack if the net effect
would be good but not if the effect would be bad, such a claim is
virtually devoid of practical significance.
Just as a war may be just at the outset but cease to be just as it
continues (because, for example, the just cause has been achieved,

7. On the idea that there may be a requirement of restraint in fighting against those
who, though in the wrong, are nevertheless fully excused, see JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING

INWAR § 4.5 (2009).
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abandoned, or supplemented by unjust aims), so an occupation
that is initially just, or unjust but justified, may become wholly
unjust and unjustified as it progresses. When this happens, it may
become perrmissible for those who are its victims to begin to use
violence to expel the unjust occupiers, and for third parties to use
violence to assist them.
Furthermore, just as those who fight in a just war may make
themselves morally liable to defensive attack when they pursue
their just cause by impermissible means or commit other wrongs or
abuses in the course of the war, so both just occupiers and justified
occupiers, including nonmilitary occupation personnel, can make
themselves liable to defensive attack when they wrongfully harm
members of the occupied population or otherwise abuse their
authority in harmful ways, for example, by committing or
sanctioning torture, rape, collective punishment, theft of land, and
so on. As I suggested earlier, however, if the occupiers are
sufficiently brutal, it may, in some instances, be wrong for the
victims of abuse to exercise their rights of self- and other-defense
in certain ways-not because to engage in defensive action would
wrong the occupiers but because a credible threat of reprisal
would make defensive action counterproductive, or worse for the
occupied people as a whole.
In the case of a just or justified occupation, defensive action
should be limited to stopping or deterring particular abuses and
should not be aimed at undermining or defeating the occupation
itself. This assumes that abuses are isolated deviations from
occupation policy. If abuses become systematic, or a matter of
policy, they may render the occupation itself unjustified, in which
case defensive action may permissibly aim at the expulsion of the
occupiers. To say that an occupation that is sufficiently badly
conducted may thereby become unjustified is not to say that any
occupation would be unjustified, but only that the particular
occupiers have disqualified themselves for the task and may not
permissibly remain as occupiers.
When I say that nonmilitary occupation personnel may be
liable to defensive action, I include not only administrators but
civilian collaborators in abuses as well. In the Israeli-occupied
West Bank, for example, civilian settlers have for decades been
engaged in a deliberate, officially-sanctioned effort by means of
transgenerational residence to establish moral claims to land that
by right must be considered Palestinian territory, the homeland of
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the Palestinian nation. The adult settlers are the culpable
perpetrators of a grave violation of the rights of an occupied
people and as such are liable to necessary and proportionate
defensive action. It may be, however, that such action can be
proportionate only if it can be effective, which at present it
probably cannot be.8 I also think that at present violent defensive
action is not necessary because active forms of nonviolent
resistance would be more effective. But if violent means were the
only feasible means and offered some promise of success, the
settlers could not claim to be morally immune from defensive
action simply by virtue of having civilian status.
VII. THE MORALITY OF OCCUPATION AND THE LAW OF
OCCUPATION

My aim in this short essay has been to open an overdue
discussion in analytic moral philosophy of the morality of military
occupation. Nothing I have said is intended to have any direct
bearing on the law of occupation. The relation between the
morality of occupation and the law of occupation is much like that
between the morality of war and the law of war. While neither the
morality of war nor the morality of occupation is neutral between
the just and the unjust, the law of occupation, like the law of war,
is and must remain neutral, at least until institutional changes
make it feasible to reform the law in ways that would bring it into
closer congruence with morality.
The principal reason why the law of occupation must at
present be neutral between just and unjust occupiers is that all
occupiers believe, or claim to believe, that their occupation is just.
Those engaged in unjustified occupations, or unjust but justified
occupations, will therefore regard themselves as permitted to do
whatever is legally permitted to just occupiers. The law governing
the conduct of occupation therefore cannot have different sets of
rules for just, justified, and unjustified occupiers; for occupiers
would not sort themselves into the correct categories and obey the.
rules that would actually apply to them. Nor is there any legal
body with sufficient authority to compel occupiers to recognize
their actual legal status. For the government of a powerful country,
such as the Bush administration in the United States, can simply

8. On the issue of hopeless resistance, see Daniel Statman, On The Success
Conditionfor Legitimate Self-Defense, 118 ETHICS 659, 659-86 (2008).
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get its corps of legal hacks to devise some meretricious reasoning
that will keep the legal controversy going long enough to allow it
to accomplish its aims.
The law of occupation must at present be designed to
encourage even unjust occupiers to accept certain constraints on
their conduct during an unjust occupation. It must, therefore,
apply neutrally to all occupiers. It must be sufficiently permissive
to enable just occupiers to achieve their legitimate aims, yet
sufficiently restrictive to impose necessary constraints on unjust
occupiers. It will therefore inevitably make various morally
permissible acts by just occupiers illegal and legally permit a
variety of morally impermissible acts by unjust occupiers, and
particularly by unjustified occupiers.
The law of occupation is, however, like the law of war in
being an area in which law ought, ideally, to coincide with
morality. This ideal of convergence has been achieved to a
considerable degree in domestic criminal law, at least in many
jurisdictions. The law of homicide, for example, is not designed, as
the law of war is, to minimize harm overall, giving equal weight to
the interests of killers and their potential victims. It is instead
designed to minimize the violation of rights and is thus radically
asymmetrical in its treatment of murderers and their potential
victims. The law of war and the law of occupation ought ideally to
be the same. It ought to be illegal to engage in acts of war that
violate people's moral rights because the war is unjust, and illegal
to violate the rights of innocent people by imposing on them the
burdens of an unjust occupation. Eventually it may indeed become
possible to create international institutions that will enable us to
overcome some of the practical obstacles-particularly those
arising from the absence of any epistemically reliable and
authoritative means of distinguishing among just, justified, and
unjustified occupations-to reforming the law in such a way that it
would impose different constraints on just and unjustified
occupiers. It is therefore important for legal purposes to think
carefully about the morality of occupation quite independently of
what the law of occupation is at present and even independently of
what it ought to be in current conditions. We should aim to
understand the morality of occupation in terms of the individual
rights and liabilities both of the occupiers and of the people
occupied. A clear understanding of this basic morality of
occupation can then provide guidance in the creation of
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institutions that will facilitate the ultimate translation of morality
into law. It can provide a template for the eventual redesign of the
law so that the permissions and prohibitions of the law coincide
more closely with those of morality.

